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Digest: In re Smith

Ryan Odenwalder

Opinion by Moreno, J., expressing the unanimous view ofthe Court.
Issue
Can a commitment be authorized under the Sexually Violent Predator
Act (SVP Act)' when the felony conviction, that was the basis of his
custody at the time the commitment proceedings began, is reversed on
appeal and the prosecutor does not retry the underlying case?
Facts
In 1982, Smith was convicted of four counts of oral copulation on a
child under sixteen years old and one count of sodomy on a child under
sixteen years old under sections 288 and 286 ofthe Penal Code .. 2 Six years
later, he was convicted of fifteen counts of committing lewd and lascivious
acts on a child under fourteen years old under Section 288. 3 He was
released on parole in July 1995 and he completed parole in July 1998.4
Because of his offenses, Smith was required to register as a sex
offender. 5 In April 1999, Smith moved to New York. 6 In September 1999,
he was arrested there after allegedly failing to send a change-of-address
card to the Long Beach Police Department. 7 He was convicted in
California of failing to register as a sex offender, where he was sentenced
to five years in state prison. 8 After the court of appeal affirmed his
conviction, the California Supreme Court granted review. 9
While waiting for the Court's decision, the director of the Department
of Corrections determined that Smith may be a sexually violent predator
(SVP) under Section 6601 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (the SVP
Act). 10 Pursuant to the SVP Act, Smith was evaluated by psychiatric
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evaluators who eventually agreed that he qualified as an SVP. 11 On
December 15, 2003, the prosecutor filed a petition to have Smith
committed as an SVP. 12
On March 29, 2004, the California Supreme Court reversed Smith's
conviction, holding that the trial court committed reversible error when it
instructed a deadlocked jury that registered sex offenders are responsible
for ensuring that the police receive the change-of-address notification. 13
Thereafter, Smith filed numerous habeas corpus petitions challenging the
continuation of the SVP commitment proceedings. 14 The court of appeal
rejected Smith's contention that the SVP Act did not authorize commitment
because the basis of his custody was reversed. 15 The Court granted
review. 16
Analysis
The Court reviewed the SVP Act, which allows the commitment of
any individual in custody who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense against two or more persons and who has a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes him a danger to others. 17 The SVP Act provides that
"[a] petition shall not be dismissed on the basis of a later judicial or
administrative determination that the individual's custody was unlawful, if
the unlawful custody was the result of a good faith mistake of fact or
law." 18
Smith argued that the statutory language, "unlawful custody," coupled
with other legislative findings, indicated that the statute applied solely
when the custody or length of the sentence is found unlawful. 19 The Court
agreed that this interpretation was reasonable, but said that the statutory
language was broad enough to include wrongful conviction. 20
The Court then noted that the legislative history showed that the
statute was enacted in response to two court of appeal decisions. 21 In the
first case, Terhune v. Superior Court, the appellate court invalidated a
regulation promulgated by the Board of Prison Terms requiring felons that
completed their sentence to remain in custody and receive psychiatric
treatment. 22 In the second case, People v. Superior Court, the appellate
court required a felon to remain subject to SVP proceedings when the
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Department of Correction's improper revocation ofhis parole was based on
a mistake of law rather than negligent or intentional misconduct. 23 The
Court concluded that the legislature added Section 660l(a)(2) to adopt a
rule similar to People v. Superior Court, addressing both good faith
mistakes of fact and law. 24
Smith also argued that the legislative history showed that Section
6601(a)(2) was intended to prevent improper extensions of custody. 25
Thus, the statute was inapplicable to a reversed conviction. 26 The
government, however, argued that the erroneous parole revocations in
Whitley are similar to erroneous convictions and that, given the concern for
public safety expressed behind the SVP Act, the statutory language should
be broadly construed to cover both. 27 The Court found that both
interpretations were reasonable because, although the legislature did not
expressly include erroneous convictions, it did intend for the statute to be
broadly applied. 28
The Court then turned to Smith's argument that the application of
Section 6601(a)(2) to erroneous convictions would violate the Equal
Protection clauses of the United States and California constitutions. 29 The
Court found that strict scrutiny applied to claims of discrimination in civil
commitment. 30 The Court discussed U.S. Supreme Court precedent
holding that equal protection is violated when civil commitment standards
applied to a defendant in custody are more lenient than standards applied to
the general population. 31 In Conservatorship of Hofferber, the Court held
that separate treatment of mentally incompetent criminal defendants under
California's general civil commitment statute, the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act (LPS Act), was justified under a strict scrutiny standard, due to the
compelling interest in public safety. 32
Applying these principles, the Court found that Smith was treated
differently under the SVP Act than those subject to the LPS Act, because
the SVP Act requires only a finding of a mental disorder that makes the
person likely to engage in sexually violent behavior if the person is in
police custody. 33 The Court found that the classification of those in
custody versus persons not in custody passed Equal Protection's strict
scrutiny because "the Legislature could legitimately conclude ... that any
felonious conduct would warrant a finding of greater danger and a separate
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classification. " 34
However, the Court said that the separate treatment, when the
conviction that is the basis of custody has been reversed, was unjustified on
constitutional grounds. 35 The Court noted that Smith was in the same
position as a person who was charged but not convicted of an offense. 36
Such a person, the Court stated, would not be subject to SVP proceedings
upon the diagnosis of a mental health professional under the LPS Act. 37
Thus, the Court found that the SVP Act did not apply to Smith. 38
Holding
The Court held that the SVP proceedings against defendant were
subject to dismissal based on the Court's reversal of the conviction that was
the basis for his custody. 39 The Court reversed the judgment ofthe court of
appea1. 40
Legal Significance
As a result of this decision, SVP proceedings against a convicted sex
offender may be halted if the conviction is reversed and either the
defendant is not retried, or the defendant is retried but not reconvicted. The
Court limited its holding to Smith's unique situation. 41 In this situation, the
defendant may be subject to the LPS Act, but that act requires a more
rigorous standard to involuntarily commit a person. The decision will
create an increased burden on the prosecutors who believe a defendant is
dangerous to society, but whose conviction is reversed.
The decision accepted the legislature's classifications as articulated by
the SVP and LPS Acts, and the SVP Act will not be impacted if the
defendant's conviction is upheld on appeal, or if the conviction is
overturned but the defendant is retried and reconvicted. The decision also
will not affect when an SVP petition may be filed-if the defendant
appeals, the petition can be stayed until a decision is made. Finally, the
Court emphasized that "the Legislature could amend the SVP Act so that it
would constitutionally apply to someone in Smith's position" by changing
the language in the statute. 42
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